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working at the nsc on detail and nato headquarters, the middle east and the pentagon. pentagon. he was adviser to four presidents, president obama asked them to lead his afghanistan-pakistan paula's review in early 2009, and do that for a couple of months before apple first returning to brookings. bruce has written two books in the time has been a, a third is about to come out and i will mention that in the second of the first two were about al qaeda and then about the is pakistan relationship. so the search for al qaeda, the deadly embrace, his new book coming out next month is avoiding armageddon. it's a story by the u.s.-india pakistan relationship and crisis management over the last half-century or so. general stan mcchrystal is a 1976 graduate of west point, spent 34 years in u.s. army, retiring as a four-star general the summer 2010. he has been command in afghanistan. use the correct of the joint staff but perhaps the military circles most of all as i mentioned this five year period at joint special operations command makes a memorable and historic. general casey at his reti
as nato took the mission, the mission evolved into something different. but it is important to remember how it started. it is absolutely, i think, a fair question to say why did you act in libya in this circumstance under the doctrine, if you will, or the principle, if you will, of the responsibility to protect noncombat taxes -- b combat taxes, why did you choose to do that in libya and not choose -- or choose to not do that in other places? each circumstance, of course, is significantly different. and it has to be measured on its own merits. it also addresses, i think, the limits of power. military power does not solve all problems. and importantly in libya, there was aup security council resolution -- a u.n. security council resolution that called for this mission and authorized all available means. in syria there is no such security council resolution that would, that would provide the legal underpinning for an operation in syria similar to what was conducted in libya. so it's a great question, but there are significant differences, i think. i should caveat all of that by reminding
with india. i could go on and on and on. nato expansion. all of the things we now take for granted were not initiatives of the clinton administration, they were initiatives of members of congress here on capitol hill who changed the world in a very meaningful way. and that is still an opportunity if only we recognize that it's something that we need to care about. sorry for my little speech, but you have two former capitol hill staffers here, so -- >> hi -- [inaudible] general question, how do we know when we've won? like with regard to the kind of counterterrorism, "zero dark thirty" movement. is there, like, a metric? how is -- does there -- >> repeat the question. the question is how do we know when we've won? >> don't worry about it. [laughter] we're in no danger of winning anytime soon. [laughter] this is, this has become a shib list because -- it's a fair question, obviously, what's your measure for success and how do we know when we've p stopped or when we can p sop. when we can stop. but we are so far away from that now, and we're further away from that now than when this presid
Search Results 0 to 2 of about 3